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Colonialism and  
Constitutional Memory 
Aziz Rana* 
The United States shares a number of basic traits with various 
British settler societies in the nonwhite world. These include longstanding 
histories in which colonists and their descendants divided legal, political, 
and economic rights between insiders and subordinated outsiders, be they 
expropriated indigenous groups or racial minorities. But Americans rarely 
think of themselves as part of an imperial family of settler polities and 
instead generally conceive of the country as quintessentially anti-imperial 
and inclusive. What explains this fact and what are its political 
consequences? 
This Article offers an initial response, arguing that a significant 
reason is the symbolic power of the American Federal Constitution in 
sustaining a particular narrative of the country as free and equal from the 
founding. Although this creedal narrative has played a powerful and 
productive role in creating a more inclusive national community, it has 
also, paradoxically, made it more difficult for Americans to appreciate the 
country’s colonial underpinnings, and thus to address specific structural 
grievances. In developing these claims, this Article first explores how 
universalistic accounts of national identity and constitutional meaning 
began to take political hold with the country’s emergence onto the global 
stage following the Spanish-American War. It then analyzes the 
unacknowledged contemporary costs of creedal narratives by recovering a 
tradition of radical black critique, which viewed the dominant national 
identity as truncating dilemmas of race in part by de-emphasizing the need 
for material restitution and symbolic rupture. 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School, 106 Myron Taylor Hall, Ithaca, NY 
14850. E-mail: ar643@cornell.edu. Phone: 607-255-5423. For discussion and extremely helpful 
comments, I would like to thank Christopher Tomlins and all the participants in the “Law As . . . ” III 
symposium at the University of California, Irvine School of Law. I also received essential feedback 
from Bill Alford, Aslı Bâli, Daragh Grant, Jeffrey Green, Murad Idris, Jeremy Kessler, Darryl Li, 
Odette Lienau, Dylan Lino, and Intisar Rabb, as well as the participants in the International and 
Comparative Law Workshop at Harvard Law School. Finally, I would like to thank Sam Cretcher and 
the rest of the UC Irvine Law Review editorial team for their invaluable work on this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE DECLINE OF SETTLER SELF-CONCEPTION 
In March 1942, General Douglas MacArthur arrived in Australia, having fled 
the Japanese assault on the Philippines, which for more than four decades had 
been the central American colonial possession in the Pacific. Speaking to a 
parliamentary dinner in Canberra, MacArthur underscored the deep personal 
importance to him of the warm Australian reception, especially given recent 
events. He declared, 
Although this is my first trip to Australia, I already feel at home. There is 
a link that binds our countries together which does not depend on 
written protocol, upon treaties of alliance or upon diplomatic doctrine. It 
goes deeper than that. It is that indescribable consanguinity of race which 
causes us to have the same aspirations, the same hopes and desires, the 
same ideals and the same dreams of future industry.1 
In focusing on the “indescribable consanguinity of race,” MacArthur was 
highlighting a shared cultural project that marked the two communities. Above all, 
both were experiments in Anglo-Protestant settlement, in which English colonists 
successfully wrested political supremacy from nonwhite indigenous groups. And 
in the context of a global war that pitted European descendants against a rising 
Asian power, Australia embodied an outpost of white rule and white values in an 
otherwise treacherous region. 
In many ways, MacArthur’s implicit invocation of a common settler 
experience linking the United States to Australia, and presumably to other polities 
like New Zealand and South Africa, was part of a longstanding refrain in 
American public life. For the better part of a century, politicians and authors had 
described the common racial identities and political predicaments facing these 
white colonies in the nonwhite world—perhaps no one more intently than 
President Theodore Roosevelt. Indeed, in 1907, following Japan’s stunning victory 
over Russia, and thus at an earlier moment of Asian ascendancy, Roosevelt—in a 
move MacArthur would have appreciated—sent the American fleet to Australia as 
a show of solidarity.2 He told a correspondent for the New York Times that the 
 
1. Douglas MacArthur, We Shall Win, or We Shall Die, in WELL MAY WE SAY . . .: THE 
SPEECHES THAT MADE AUSTRALIA 107, 107–08 (Sally Warhaft ed., 2004); see also Nikhil Pal Singh, 
The Problem of Color and Democracy, in THE SHORT AMERICAN CENTURY: A POSTMORTEM 59, 64 
(Andrew J. Bacevich ed., 2012) (quoting General MacArthur). 
2. See MARILYN LAKE & HENRY REYNOLDS, DRAWING THE GLOBAL COLOUR LINE: 
WHITE MEN’S COUNTRIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE OF RACIAL EQUALITY 199 
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fleet’s presence there was necessary to emphasize to the world “that those 
colonies are white man’s country.”3 
For Roosevelt, Australia, like the United States, embodied the hegemony of 
“English-speaking peoples over the world’s waste spaces,”4 in the process 
spreading civilization across the globe. This fact “ha[d] been not only the most 
striking feature in the world’s history, but also the event of all others most far-
reaching in its effects and importance.”5 But in the view of Roosevelt, such 
hegemony was increasingly imperiled. If anything, the great twentieth century 
challenge was the preservation of white settler dominance—and with it European 
civilization itself—under conditions of indigenous uprising and growing nonwhite 
political assertiveness. 
Predicting the demise of white power in South Africa, Roosevelt worried 
that the civilizing mission would inevitably fail there because, unlike the United 
States, where Anglo settlers had been able to “exterminate[ ]”6 the Indians, white 
South Africans were “confronted by a very large native population with which 
they cannot mingle, and which neither dies out nor recedes before their advance.”7 
These hard truths only elevated the importance of white success in Australia and 
New Zealand, colonial experiments that bore the most “resemblance”8 to the 
United States. He hailed Australian historian and journalist Charles Pearson’s 1893 
book National Life and Character: A Forecast in which the author too foresaw a 
twentieth century of receding European power and thus presented Australia as 
“guarding the last part of the world, in which the higher races can live and increase 
freely, for higher civilisation.”9 According to Roosevelt, the text was nothing less 
than “one of the most notable books of the end of the century.”10 
Such concerns about the future viability of settler colonization and white 
imperial authority, widespread in the early twentieth-century United States, speak 
to a profoundly different way of imagining the national project than what citizens 
today would find recognizable. Many white Americans at the time took for 
granted—and indeed positively identified with—the fact that the country was an 
important piece in a global European project of imperial conquest. Akin to white 
societies in South Africa and Australia, they understood their own community as a 
project of settlement structured fundamentally around a basic legal, political, and 
economic divide between insiders and subordinated outsiders, be they 
 
(2008) (quoting Roosevelt as explaining his decision to send the fleet based upon a belief that 
“America should be ready to stand back of Australia in any serious emergency”). 
3. Id. at 197. 
4. See THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THE WINNING OF THE WEST 21 (Hastings House 1963) 
(1889). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 28. 
7. Id. at 29. 
8. Id. 
9. CHARLES PEARSON, NATIONAL LIFE AND CHARACTER: A FORECAST 17 (2d ed. 1913). 
10. Theodore Roosevelt, National Life and Character, 2 SEWANEE REV. 353, 353 (1894). 
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expropriated Native Americans, formerly enslaved blacks, or even Asian migrants, 
the last group confined to the category of “aliens ineligible to citizenship.”11 In 
taking for granted that the United States was what I have elsewhere called a 
“settler empire,” most Americans had long presumed that collective institutions 
were meant to do two things simultaneously. First, they were supposed to provide 
racially defined insiders with the emancipatory conditions of self-government and 
economic independence. And second, to support this overarching project, these 
institutions were designed to extract much-needed land and labor from native and 
nonsettler groups, in the latter case particularly African slaves and their 
descendants.12 Above all, if the term “settler empire” would not have been familiar 
to early twentieth-century Americans, the basic ethical vision and political 
objectives certainly would have. 
Today, by contrast, to describe in mainstream public discussion the United 
States as part of an imperial family of settler societies would be deeply jarring. 
Americans are certainly painfully aware of a past marked by both native 
dispossession and African slavery. But these features of the collective experience 
are integrated into a very particular narrative about national identity, one in which 
the country is understood to be the quintessential civic polity. In the words of 
Michael Ignatieff, the American community, rather than being grounded in 
prepolitical ethnic, religious, or racial ties, has long been constituted by “equal, 
rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political 
practices and values.”13 This fact places the American project in an exceptional 
position, standing outside the contested histories of Europe—particularly its bitter 
conflicts over class and empire—and enjoying a distinctive character vis-à-vis 
other nation-states. 
No doubt most commentators, Ignatieff included, readily admit that the 
United States has never fully lived up to these civic values. Yet as Swedish 
sociologist Gunnar Myrdal declared in the 1940s, while the country may have only 
partially achieved its ideals, “[t]he main trend” in American history has been “the 
gradual realization of the American Creed.”14 Thus, such a view accepts the 
practical reality of injustice, particularly the sinfulness of slavery, but understands 
the United States to be at root a liberal society engaged in a process of self-
fulfillment. Ignatieff, like Myrdal before him, sees the country’s civic promise as 
the essential truth of the American experience, a truth steadily redeemed over 
 
11. For more on the treatment of Asians as culturally unfit for settler membership, see 
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 70–75 (2006). 
12. See AZIZ RANA, TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (2010). In particular, see id. at 12–
14, for a fuller account of American settler empire—including its ideologies and constitutional 
practices. 
13. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW 
NATIONALISM 3–4 (1993). 
14. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY 1021 (1962). 
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time, while representing the ascriptive and exclusive elements as aberrational.15 
Most telling about this dominant narrative is that it neglects to depict the civic 
drive—aimed at vesting sovereignty in all people “regardless of race, colour, creed, 
gender, language or ethnicity”16—as only a relatively recent development. Instead, 
this account reads such aspirations back into the very founding of the United 
States, albeit while accepting the extent to which equality may have been deferred 
in historical fact. 
A large part of why exceptionalist narratives of American civic identity have 
had such a powerful grip on the national imagination is because of the presumed 
symbolic meaning of the Federal Constitution. According to today’s scholars and 
commentators, the Constitution gives concrete substance to the country’s civic 
ideals, generating a political order grounded in democratic consent, pluralism, and 
equal rights for all. In Cass Sunstein’s words, “exceptionalism is real” and “[i]t 
began in 1787, with the Constitution’s effort to establish a large, self-governing 
republic, in which diverse views serve as both a safeguard and a creative force.”17 
Quoting Alexander Hamilton’s language in Federalist No. 1, Sunstein declares that 
while European history, marked by social conflict and monarchical despotism, has 
been the product of “accident and force,” the defining feature of the American 
experiment—expressed most profoundly by that initial act of constitutional 
construction—is instead the effort to base politics on “reflection and choice.”18 
For Jack Balkin, the 1787 Constitution provided the “legal and political” 
mechanisms through which the Declaration of Independence’s promise of equal 
liberty could “be redeemed in history.”19 The Constitution’s writing and 
ratification are therefore the constituent acts of American exceptionalism and civic 
founding, embodying above all the collective break from an imperial and 
absolutist Europe. 
Ultimately, what is especially remarkable about the contemporary framing of 
the United States as a civic polity is how it erases, almost entirely, the colonial 
structure of the American past. According to the civic imagination, to the extent 
that the United States bears any meaningful relationship to European histories of 
empire, it is not as a sustained experiment in settler colonization. Rather, the 
country from its birth has been anti-imperial, conceived as an assault on an entire 
“system of social hierarchy.”20 Indeed, for Seymour Martin Lipset, the very 
essence of American exceptionalism is its status as the first postcolonial society as 
opposed to a continuation of European colonialism: “The United States is 
 
15. See IGNATIEFF, supra note 13, at 6–7. 
16. See id. at 3. 
17. Cass Sunstein, The Real Meaning of American Exceptionalism, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Sept. 23, 
2013, 9:00 AM EDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-23/the-real-meaning-of-
american-exceptionalism.html. 
18. Id. 
19. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD 19 (2011). 
20. Id. at 21. 
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exceptional in . . . being ‘the first new nation,’ the first colony, other than Iceland, 
to become independent.”21 If anything, under this civic framing, the American 
experience—whatever the problems of inequality—has more in common with the 
independence projects of indigenous societies than it does with English settler 
experiments in South Africa, Australia, or New Zealand. 
How does a community reconstruct the meaning of its own past—to such an 
extent that defining historical attributes no longer resonate at all with collective 
self-perceptions—and what are the long-term consequences of such a 
reconstruction? Over the following pages, I offer a sketch of the process by which 
white Americans came to think of themselves in civic rather than settler terms, 
and then turn to a consideration of what this shift has meant for issues of racial 
equality and native self-determination. I begin in Part I by contending that the 
initial move toward a sustained civic identity occurred not at the founding, 
Reconstruction, or even the more recent civil rights period. Rather, civic identity 
as a growing public sentiment developed out of a sense of ideological uncertainty 
that enveloped the United States in the early twentieth century. In particular, the 
closing of the frontier and the country’s emergence onto the global stage with the 
Spanish-American War raised basic questions about the future of colonial 
settlement as well as the meaning of American power in the world. In this context, 
many white Americans began to rally around a specific reading of the Constitution 
as the moment at which universally accessible Enlightenment principles first took 
historic root, thus presenting the country in explicitly exceptionalist terms. This 
view separated European imperialism on the one hand from American global 
influence on the other, with the latter depicted as benign tutelage fundamentally in 
keeping with the basic interests of nonwhite peoples. Such civic arguments, 
structured around the symbol of the Constitution, steadily reimagined the country 
in more inclusive terms. But they also provided an ideological framework that 
allowed classically privileged American insiders to preserve nonetheless the basic 
institutional structures of the polity—those of an increasingly completed settler 
project—while at the same time asserting greater authority abroad. 
Part II then argues that although such civic self-conception has brought with 
it profound social improvements that cannot be underestimated, it has also come 
at a significant cost. The country’s identitarian shift from settler to civic nation has 
meant that Americans have never properly confronted the county’s colonial 
infrastructure or the living legacy of its settler history. As a consequence, today’s 
vision of the country as intrinsically—if incompletely—liberal systematically 
deemphasizes those forms of economic and political subordination that continue 
to mark the experience of historically marginalized communities. In effect, the two 
narratives of national identity—settler and civic—should not be thought of as 
establishing fundamentally distinct legal and political periods. Rather, the lack of a 
 
21. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED 
SWORD 18 (1996). 
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proper reckoning with the past has meant that prevailing civic ideologies remain 
institutionally and conceptually interlinked with settler ones; thus, the two eras of 
national identity fold into one another instead of marking a clear chronological 
divide or break in political time. 
I pursue these thoughts by recovering a black political tradition especially 
dominant with the radicalization of the civil rights movement in the late 1960s. 
This tradition maintained that the emphasis on the American Revolution’s anti-
imperial dimension undermined the ability of most twentieth-century Americans 
to appreciate the extent to which their society was a continuation of European 
projects of empire. These black thinkers focused their critique on the centrality of 
the Constitution for sustaining narratives of American exceptionalism and civic 
identity. They were especially attracted to such constitutional critique—and to the 
colonial framing more generally—because they believed that the politics of civic 
inclusion truncated the dilemma of race in the United States, de-emphasizing both 
the links to global structures of inequality and the need for more thoroughgoing 
socioeconomic changes. Just as important, the language of colonialism allowed 
both black radicals and indigenous activists to highlight an unacknowledged harm 
to subordinated groups generated by traditional creedal accounts. These accounts 
compelled outsiders, as a condition of any reform, to accept and repeat self-
validating majority narratives. They seemed to require that marginalized 
communities deny both their own sense of profound alienation as well as their 
belief that such alienation spoke to a constitutive and oppressive truth about the 
nation’s identity. 
By way of a conclusion, I discuss the basic reasons why black power activists, 
especially those associated with the Black Panther Party, argued for a new 
constitutional convention and a conscious break from the existing legal order. 
Such calls were above all part of a sustained effort to make apparent to Americans 
a striking fact about the shift in national consciousness from settler to civic self-
conception. According to black radicals, white Americans had essentially adopted 
a postcolonial sense of nationhood despite the fact that the country had never 
gone through an actual process of systematic decolonization, one akin to those 
initiated in newly freed Asian and African countries. In such former colonies, 
much of the independence project concerned the formal and substantive transfer 
of economic and political power from imperial elites to historically subordinated 
populations. But in the United States, by contrast, at no point did historically 
oppressed groups successfully generate a similar and explicit institutional or 
normative rupture from the American settler past—including its governing 
structures and prevailing national symbols—nor did they succeed in claiming 
either material reparations or meaningful indigenous sovereignty. In fact, part of 
the discursive power of civic national identity continues to come from its 
disavowal of any need for such structural transformation, precisely since it reads a 
liberal and egalitarian identity into the country’s very genesis. 
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I. HOW A SETTLER SOCIETY RECONCEIVED ITS OWN PAST 
In many ways, today’s dominant language of civic identity consciously 
repeats a set of arguments developed by Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War. 
Lincoln famously referred to the Declaration of Independence as an “apple of 
gold” framed in the “picture of silver” that was the Constitution.22 By this, he meant 
that the animating purpose of the constitutional project was to fulfill the 
egalitarian promise of the Declaration: “The picture was made, not to conceal, 
or destroy the apple; but to adorn, and preserve it. The picture was made for the 
apple—not the apple for the picture.”23 Crucially, for my purposes, although 
Lincoln may have evoked such civic ideals in the context of debates over slavery 
and secession, this vision did not reflect how the overwhelming majority of white 
Americans understood their collective project and its relationship to the 
Constitution, either during the antebellum period or in the closing decades of the 
nineteenth century. 
In fact, the far more entrenched pre-Civil War view was that the country was 
a white republic and the Constitution served as the governing document for this 
racially defined community. As Stephen Douglas declared during his victorious 
Senate campaign against Lincoln: 
I hold that a negro is not and never ought to be a citizen of the United 
States. . . . I hold that this government was made on the white basis, by 
white men, for the benefit of white men and their posterity forever, and 
should be administered by white men and none others. . . . [T]he signers 
of the Declaration [of Independence] had no reference to the negro 
whatever when they declared all men to be created equal. They desired to 
express by that phrase, white men, men of European birth and European 
descent, and had no reference either to the negro, the savage Indians, the 
Fejee, the Malay, or any other inferior and degraded race, when they 
spoke of the equality of men.24 
This sentiment even shaped the era’s Republican Party, whose leadership, as legal 
historian Mark Graber reminds us, “routinely described their coalition as a ‘white 
man’s party’ and proposed ‘to settle the Territories with free, white men.’”25 
Indeed, with strong Republican backing, nonslave African Americans were not 
only barred from entrance into frontier states like Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and 
Oregon, they also were explicitly barred from claiming property through western 
land grants.26 
 
22. Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on the Constitution and Union ( Jan. 1861), in 4 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 168, 169 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953). 
23. Id. 
24. See Senator Stephen Douglas, Speech at the Third Lincoln-Douglas Debate, Jonesboro, Ill. 
(Sept. 15, 1858), reprinted in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832–1858, at 598 
(Don. E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989). 
25. MARK GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 80 
(2006). 
26. See RANA, supra note 12, at 118. 
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Moreover, Douglas’s alternative vision of the Declaration as racially 
circumscribed spoke to a profound truth deemphasized by Lincolnian rhetoric. 
Alongside the egalitarian dimension, Thomas Jefferson had also highlighted as 
grievances against the British Empire the crown’s responsibility for “excit[ing] 
domestic insurrections amongst us, and . . . endeavor[ing] to bring on the 
inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages.”27 In effect, the 
Declaration did not evoke a civic promise of equal liberty unproblematically. Its 
language taken as a whole instead intertwined arguments for internal settler 
freedom with a clear drive to pacify those external threats posed by both excluded 
slaves and expropriated Indians. 
For all these reasons, radical abolitionists as well as African Americans—the 
only real constituencies in the antebellum period that imagined a multiracial 
community—often directly attacked the central symbols of national identity. For 
instance, before the Civil War, free blacks tended to celebrate Independence Day 
on July 5th as a conscious commentary on black enslavement and exclusion from 
the body politic.28 For instance, Frederick Douglass’s famous 1852 address to the 
Antislavery Society of Rochester, What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?, was 
delivered on July 5th since, according to historian Mason Lowance, Douglass “did 
not wish to participate in the celebration of hypocrisy and could not join the 
festivities recalling the Declaration of Independence.”29 Even more pointedly, Nat 
Turner’s slave revolt had been planned to begin on July 4, 1831.30 As for the 
Constitution, prominent radical abolitionists like William Lloyd Garrison 
denounced the text’s accommodations with slavery as an “agreement with hell.”31 
In the era’s most notorious act of constitutional opposition, Garrison, outraged by 
a Boston federal judge’s decision returning a fugitive slave, Anthony Burns, to his 
Virginia owner, burnt a copy of the U.S. Constitution before an 1854 
Independence Day audience.32 
This vision of the country as first and foremost a white Republic, and of the 
Constitution as its ruling text, remained solidly entrenched for decades after the 
Civil War.33 If anything, with the collapse of Reconstruction, the Lincolnian 
narrative of the relationship between the Constitution and Declaration of 
 
27. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 29 (U.S. 1776). 
28. See MATTHEW DENNIS, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE LETTER DAYS: AN AMERICAN 
CALENDAR 24 (2002). 
29. Mason Lowance, Frederick Douglass (1818–1895), in AGAINST SLAVERY: AN 
ABOLITIONIST READER 38 (Mason Lowance ed., 2000). 
30. DENNIS, supra note 28, at 287 n.18. 
31. William Lloyd Garrison introduced a resolution before the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery 
Society in 1843, stating: “That the compact which exists between the North and the South is ‘a 
covenant with death, and an agreement with hell,’—involving both parties in atrocious criminality; 
and should be immediately annulled.” BALKIN, supra note 19, at 253 n.7 (quoting William Lloyd  
Garrison). 
32. Eric Foner, Blacks and the U.S. Constitution 1789–1989, 183 NEW LEFT REV. 63, 63 (1990). 
33. See RANA, supra note 12, at 182–93; see also DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: 
THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY 338–80 (2001). 
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Independence retreated to the political margins by the turn of the twentieth 
century34—a point highlighted by Teddy Roosevelt’s colonial rhetoric described in 
the introduction. In the interceding years, the country had witnessed the 
consolidation of white supremacy in the South through brutal force, facilitated by 
a mixture of Northern white indifference and complicity. In many ways future 
President Woodrow Wilson, the son of a Virginia slave owner, better captured the 
prevailing judgments about national identity and radical Reconstruction than did a 
Lincolnian view.35 According to Wilson, Reconstruction promoted a destructive 
project of racial readjustment, in which Republicans imposed black voting and 
legal protections on Southern whites, the region’s “real citizens.”36 For him and 
many others, “the sudden and absolute emancipation”37 of slaves, and especially 
the efforts to impose equal citizenship on whites, embodied a “dark chapter of 
history.”38 To underscore just how widely such views were held, even socialists 
like Victor Berger took for granted the racially circumscribed nature of American 
membership, declaring “there can be no doubt that the Negroes and mulattoes 
constitute a lower race.”39 
The governing account of national identity only began to change 
permanently with the completion of the settler project itself. At the beginning of 
the twentieth century, the closing of the frontier meant that the historic role of 
territorial expansion in sustaining American economic growth and internal settler 
prosperity would soon come to an end. In effect, the very success of American 
colonization imperiled the future viability of what amounted to the settler way of 
life. One solution, increasingly embraced by political and economic elites, was to 
engage in practices of economic and political expansionism abroad as the natural 
extension of settler territorial growth. As Frederick Jackson Turner wrote in 1893 
of the national experience, “Movement has been its dominant fact, and, unless this 
training has no effect upon a people, the American energy will continually demand 
a wider field for its exercise.”40 For Turner and others like him, just as the project 
 
34. See BLIGHT, supra note 33, at 381–97. 
35. Historian Michael Dennis describes Wilson as personifying the emerging white middle 
class sensibilities in the urban South, especially the commitment to “regional progress through 
national reconciliation, industrial growth, agricultural diversification, and racial control.” Michael 
Dennis, Looking Backward: Woodrow Wilson, the New South, and the Question of Race, 3 AM. NINETEENTH 
CENTURY HIST. 77, 77 (2002). 
36. Id. at 82 (quoting Woodrow Wilson, Reconstruction of the Southern States, 87 ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY 1, 11 (1901)). 
37. Wilson, supra note 36, at 6. 
38. Id. at 11. Wilson decried Reconstruction practices for producing 
a vast “laboring, landless, homeless class,” once slaves, now free; unpracticed in liberty, 
unschooled in self-control; never sobered by the discipline of self-support, never 
established in any habit of prudence; excited by a freedom they did not understand, exalted 
by false hopes; bewildered and without leaders, and yet insolent and aggressive, sick of 
work, covetous of pleasure,—a host of dusky children untimely put out of school. 
Id. at 6. 
39. MARK PITTENGER, AMERICAN SOCIALISTS AND EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT, 1870–
1920, at 181 (1993) (quoting Victor Berger). 
40. See FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 37 (1920). 
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of continental conquest had in the past promoted internal wealth and external 
power, greater assertiveness on the global stage could now serve similar ends. 
But whatever its potential benefits, the ideological and practical problems 
with a new grab for international power were manifold. To begin with, the classic 
method of territorial conquest in the United States had been white settlement, 
with new land steadily incorporated into the republic on grounds of equal 
statehood. But land in the Americas and especially in Asia could not be colonized 
in this way. Indeed, as one commentator noted, formally annexing distant foreign 
territory created the likelihood of ruling over racially distinct nonwhite 
communities in a context that “forb[ade] the hope that Americans will migrate to 
it in sufficient numbers to elevate its social conditions and ultimately justify its 
admission as a State.”41 Even more important, the country had appeared on the 
global stage at a decidedly late moment, after the most valuable colonial 
possessions had already been claimed.42 This limited the usefulness of direct 
colonial rule as either a symbol of national strength or a means for expanding 
economic and political power. 
Finally, the American foray into overseas empire with the Spanish-American 
War emphasized the profound pitfalls of becoming ensnared in colonial 
adventures. The takeover of the Philippines generated a massive indigenous 
uprising, one that was only suppressed after years of intense fighting and the 
brutal application of military force.43 This experience brought home not only the 
costs in blood and treasure of maintaining actual foreign land, but also emerging 
truths about nonwhite political assertiveness. It reinforced arguments in the public 
discourse, such as those associated with the Australian Charles Pearson, regarding 
the precariousness of permanent white control across the colonized world.44 All 
these issues emphasized that if American authority were to expand abroad, it 
would have to do so in a way that came to grips with new global realities. 
Especially following events in the Philippines, a growing number of political 
elites responded to these dilemmas by repurposing the Lincolnian narrative of a 
universalist national identity, only now to justify a new vision of American 
international mission.45 This vision was conceived as inherently anti-imperial and 
suspicious of maintaining expensive foreign colonies.46 And by focusing on the 
United States’ own break from Britain, the account of national identity also 
highlighted the perceived differences between American and European values. 
Rather than treating foreign territories as extractive assets, the United States’ 
global ambition concerned the spread of mutually advantageous commercial trade, 
 
41. See Carman F. Randolph, Constitutional Aspects of Annexation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 291, 304 
(1898). 
42. See RANA, supra note 12, at 283. 
43. See MICHAEL H. HUNT & STEVEN I. LEVINE, ARC OF EMPIRE: AMERICA’S WARS IN 
ASIA FROM THE PHILIPPINES TO VIETNAM 10–63 (2012). 
44. PEARSON, supra note 9, at 31. 
45. RANA, supra note 12, at 262–90. 
46. Id. 
Rana_production read v3 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 6/28/2015  9:16 PM 
274 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:263 
democratic self-government, and above all international peace.47 Interventionists 
therefore stressed the shared benefits for all communities, regardless of race or 
ethnicity, of enhanced American power, and in the process de-emphasized the 
need for formal land acquisition let alone actual white settlement.48 In fact, such 
elites reframed the project in the Philippines not as one of a colonial scramble, but 
rather as that of assisting an indigenous population on a path to ultimate self-
determination.49 
In developing this civic account, the Constitution increasingly played a 
central role in arguments about the inherently inclusive nature of American 
identity and thus American authority abroad. For those like David Jayne Hill, 
diplomat, university president, and influential author of Americanism: What It is 
(1916), what most distinguished the American character from Old Europe was the 
document itself.50 Whereas European communities were the product of feudalism 
as well as political and religious absolutism—and thus disposed to treat foreign 
populations instrumentally—the Constitution underscored how the American 
experiment had been built instead on an effort to fulfill universal Enlightenment 
principles. Hill claimed that the Federal Constitution above all “developed here in 
America a new estimate of human values, and this has led to a new understanding 
of life.”51 Contrasting European monarchical despotism with American 
commitments to liberty and self-government, Hill—in words virtually identical to 
Cass Sunstein’s today—declared that the “original and distinctive contribution of 
the American mind to political theory” was the focus on eliminating “forever the 
recurrence of absolutism in every form, whether official or popular, whether of 
dominant individuals or of popular majorities.”52 
Moreover, in line with the Lincolnian idea that the Constitution gave 
substance to the egalitarian aspirations of the Declaration, Hill maintained that 
“Americanism” was not reducible to racial criteria: 
It cannot be maintained that Americanism . . . is a matter of race. Our 
country from the beginning has been populated by people of widely 
different ethnic origins. Some of their qualities are perpetuated with 
practically little effacement, others are obscured by the syncretism of 
races; but there is no definable ethnic type that is exclusively entitled to 
be called American.53 
Rather than merely a white settler polity no different than Australia or South 
Africa, the Constitution was living proof that Americans had produced a 
 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. For a more complete account of the shifting visions of external power and national 
identity in the context of the Spanish-American War and the occupation of the Philippines, see 
generally id. 
50. See DAVID JAYNE HILL, AMERICANISM: WHAT IT IS, at vii–x (1916). 
51. Id. at viii. 
52. Id. at 27. 
53. Id. at vii. 
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phenomenon unique in global history: they had erected out of divergent racial 
communities a single, unified, and powerful nation committed to inclusive civic 
values. Hill and others at the time began to map out an early twentieth century 
variant of what scholar Nikhil Pal Singh has called “American universalism”54—
the idea that what establishes the United States as exceptional is its status as the 
first nation truly grounded on equal liberty for all. 
Such claims about the interconnection between American constitutionalism 
and American exceptionalism emphasized how an expanded U.S. role abroad 
served the basic interests of foreign populations. According to Hill, European 
Powers sought to divide the world based on the principle of “imperialism”55 and 
thus treated other communities as little more than material spoils. Given these 
facts, and the increasing disorder wrought by European action, both domestic 
security and international peace required a far greater national presence. Precisely 
because the American civic vision, embodied by the Constitution, was “antithetical 
to Imperialism, whose watchword is unlimited power,”56 only the United States 
could offer the world a counterbalance to European hegemony. In opposition to 
empire, the constitutional principle meant that American authority was centrally 
about creating the conditions in foreign, oftentimes nonwhite, societies for 
peaceful self-government. Distinguishing U.S. control over the Philippines from 
European practices in Asia and Africa, Hill argued that American conduct on the 
island had been a step in the advancement of civilization and democratic order. 
Glossing over the actual history of extreme American violence, he declared, “[W]e 
have taken in tutelage a population in its political childhood and conscientiously 
striven to lay the foundations for its future self-government.”57 In other words, 
although it may have required American imposition, at stake in the Philippines was 
not imperial rule but the entrenchment of civic values and Enlightenment 
principles in a culturally undeveloped region. 
Even Woodrow Wilson pursued the logical implications of this inclusive 
narrative of American power. In his 1916 address to the Railway Business 
Association, Wilson made clear that the country’s global ambitions did not entail 
new colonial dependencies.58 Also emphasizing the essentially anti-imperial nature 
of U.S. global authority, Wilson declared, “There is no spirit of aggrandizement in 
America. There is no desire on the part of any thoughtful and conscientious 
 
54. See NIKHIL PAL SINGH, BLACK IS A COUNTRY: RACE AND THE UNFINISHED STRUGGLE 
FOR DEMOCRACY 17–18 (2004) (“‘American universalism,’ historian John Higham summarizes, is 
‘our egalitarian ideology . . . molded by the Enlightenment and forged in the revolution . . . 
simultaneously a civic credo, a social vision and a definition of nationhood.’” (ellipses in original)). 
55. HILL, supra note 50, at 134. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 177. 
58. See President Woodrow Wilson, Address to the Railway Business Association, N.Y. ( Jan. 
27, 1916), reprinted in THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF WOODROW WILSON 268, 268–69 (E. David 
Cronon ed., 1965). 
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American man to take one foot of territory from any other nation in the world.”59 
This of course did not mean that military and economic interventions were not 
critical to nonwhite tutelage or to the spread of civic ideals. In the same speech, 
Wilson, echoing Hill, spoke in laudatory terms of the Spanish-American War:  
The world sneered when we set out upon the liberation of Cuba, but the 
world sneers no longer. The world now knows, what it was then loathe to 
believe, that a nation can sacrifice its own interests and its own blood for 
the sake of the liberty and happiness of another people.60  
For Wilson too, the American projection of power, if necessary through actual 
military force, was a key tool in promoting a tranquil and civilized global 
community. 
As underscored by the persistent language of tutelage, the emerging civic 
rhetoric of American universalism was above all an adaptation rather than a 
rejection of the settler past. It was promoted by privileged insiders and consciously 
embraced the history of North American colonization as proof of the country’s 
exceptional status. Indeed, in order for Hill and others to explain why Americans 
were worthy of global leadership, they focused especially on the idea that the 
particularities of colonial settlement generated a culturally distinct community, one 
that allowed universal creedal values to flourish in the first place. According to 
Hill, the earliest colonists left monarchical England because of a “protest against 
mere power,”61 and in fact the first truly American charter of liberty was not the 
Constitution but the November 11, 1620 Mayflower Compact. Long before 
England’s 1647 “Agreement of the People” or the later writings of Locke and 
Rousseau, settler colonists—“a company of plain men, sailing over wintry seas to 
an unknown land with the purpose of escaping the too heavy hand of an absolute 
government”62—forged “the beginning of real self-government.”63 Thus, the 
reason why the framers were later able to devise the Constitution was because they 
had been raised in a political community attuned to practices of self-rule and 
principles of liberty. This meant that the Constitution, a century and a half later, 
was just the culmination of a specifically American cultural commitment to the 
“voluntary renunciation of arbitrary power.”64 
Such a settler experience therefore not only explained why the United States 
enjoyed a special and redemptive global mission, it also spoke to why white 
Americans in particular were equipped at home and abroad to supervise projects 
of tutelage and racial uplift. In essence, the emerging civic self-conception, 
especially through arguments about exceptionalism and constitutional founding, 
combined seemingly conflicting political ideas of universalism and cultural 
 
59. Id. at 269. 
60. Id. 
61. HILL, supra note 50, at 13–15. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 15. 
64. Id. at 29. 
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superiority. Figures like Hill may have believed in the theoretical fitness of all 
ethnic and racial groups for full self-government. But transforming this theoretical 
fitness into reality entailed a sustained project of white stewardship in which racial 
and ethnic communities both within the United States and in distant lands would 
be led from their “political childhood” into a civilized adulthood. In this way, and 
perhaps counterintuitively, the increasing prominence of civic notions provided a 
powerful mechanism for preserving ethno-cultural accounts of American identity 
and with them settler privilege. 
What these facts bring home is the extent to which the shift to civic 
frameworks emerged out of efforts by political elites to make sense of how best to 
promote American power under radically altered circumstances. Thus, civic 
accounts, grounded especially in a budding vision of the Constitution as a symbol 
of American inclusiveness, were the ideological outgrowth of a fundamentally 
settler imagination and predicament—namely, how to conceive of collective 
purpose given the completion of North American expansion. Slowly, and over the 
course of decades, these accounts eclipsed the preexisting view of the United 
States as an exclusively white republic. Domestically, they created the political 
space for liberalizing reform efforts such as the push to end segregation and to 
provide legal protections to historically excluded groups. Indeed, creedal 
arguments about American exceptionalism allowed civil rights leaders like Martin 
Luther King, Jr., half a century later, to depict black inclusion as part of the 
country’s founding aspirations, albeit “essentially a dream, a dream yet 
unfulfilled.”65 And today, the dominance of the civic self-conception is so 
comprehensive that citizens no longer even perceive its settler roots and genesis. 
But as the following section highlights, these settler roots underscore the 
persistent continuities between the civic present and the colonizing past—
continuities that only rarely have been confronted directly in American political 
life. 
II. BLACK POWER AND RECALLING THE COLONIAL LEGACY 
Perhaps the most sustained and broad-based public examination of the 
country’s colonial legacy took place during the late 1960s. Against the backdrop of 
independence movements in Asia and Africa, African American activists, 
especially those who gravitated toward ideas of black power, increasingly 
presented their relationship to mainstream society as akin to that of colonized 
communities in the so-called Third World.66 In the process, they directly 
challenged narratives of American universalism and exceptionalism and denied the 
basic legitimacy of the existing constitutional order, which they viewed as the great 
 
65. See Martin Luther King, Jr., The American Dream (Feb. 5, 1964), in A TESTAMENT OF 
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 208, 208 ( James 
M. Washington ed., 1990). 
66. See infra text accompanying notes 86–93. 
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symbol of the prevailing civic identity.67 With the collapse of both the student and 
civil rights movements, today these arguments—along with the settler legacy they 
recall—have essentially receded from memory. But they nonetheless provide a 
critical means for appreciating the significant costs associated with our 
contemporary reconstruction of the national experience as a liberal and 
redemptive project from the founding. 
In many ways, black power activists developed their position in response to 
what they viewed as the limitations of the traditional civil rights framework, a 
framework that refrained from challenging the civic account of the American 
experience and instead sought to unleash its reformist potential.68 In the 1950s, 
middle class African Americans, along with liberal white allies, presented the 
struggle for black freedom as one of fulfilling the universal ideals embedded in the 
Constitution. Analogous to arguments made earlier in the century by David Jayne 
Hill, the principal civil rights discourse maintained that American belonging was 
not racially defined but built on shared and inclusive liberal values.69 This 
articulation of how antiracism fulfilled notions of American universalism drew 
especially from Gunnar Myrdal’s classic study An American Dilemma. For Myrdal, 
the Constitution embodied what he called “the American creed”70 and through the 
text “[t]his nation early laid down as the moral basis for its existence the principles 
of equality and liberty.”71 This meant that at its core the United States—the nation 
where the Enlightenment took historical root—was “humanity in miniature.”72 
Such arguments presented the United States as an essentially liberal national 
experiment, contaminated in the present by un-American and illiberal practices of 
racism. This vision of the country—as a fundamentally universalist polity on a 
march toward liberal completeness—carried with it key implications for the civil 
rights agenda at home and for American power abroad. At home, fulfilling the 
creed primarily entailed ending formal discrimination and providing worthy 
elements within the black community with an equal opportunity to enjoy 
professional and middle-class respectability.73 It emphasized social mobility for 
black elites and meritocratic inclusion for some into arenas of corporate and 
political power.74 Abroad, the invocation of the creed, as Nikhil Pal Singh writes, 
“upheld the prerogatives of the American national security state.”75 Precisely since 
 
67. See infra text accompanying notes 86–93. 
68. RANA, supra note 12, at 329–30. 
69. Id. 
70. See generally MYRDAL, supra note 14. Myrdal contended that “American civilization early 
acquired a flavor of enlightenment which affected the ordinary American’s whole personality” and 
generated a creedal commitment to “liberty, equality, justice, and fair opportunity for everybody.” Id. 
at lxx, lxxii. 
71. Id. at 1021. 
72. Id. 
73. RANA, supra note 12, at 329–30. 
74. Id. 
75. See Nikhil Pal Singh, The Black Panthers and the “Undeveloped Country” of the Left, in THE 
BLACK PANTHER PARTY RECONSIDERED 57, 73 (Charles E. Jones ed., 1998). 
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U.S. civic commitments expressed the world community’s ideals, the projection of 
American power necessarily meant the defense of inclusive values against illiberal 
threats. As Myrdal argued, Americans stood “warmheartedly against oppression in 
all the world.”76 
In effect, the traditional civil rights discourse allowed activists to combine a 
reform politics of black integration at home with a Cold War commitment to 
supporting U.S. objectives internationally. In this way, activists were able to 
construct a deeply appealing account of black equality for white politicians at the 
national level, who themselves were increasingly embarrassed by the eyesore of 
southern segregation. These politicians and the constituencies they represented 
could see racial reform as simply making archaic regional practices consistent with 
those prevailing across the country—in the process, preserving American 
domestic economic and political stability while strengthening U.S. moral standing 
globally, especially in newly independent nations. 
But by the late 1960s, the failure of legal desegregation to address deep-
rooted socioeconomic hierarchies, alongside the war in Vietnam, left many black 
activists increasingly discontented with the traditional civil rights embrace of civic 
nationalist rhetoric. For those that gravitated to the idea of black power, the 1950s 
and early 1960s focus on American universalism and the American creed 
concealed more than it illuminated. In particular, it undermined the ability of most 
Americans, white and black, to appreciate the extent to which the country from its 
birth had been an enterprise in colonialism—an extension of European empire 
rather than an egalitarian and anti-imperial break. As Stokely Carmichael and 
Charles Hamilton wrote in Black Power of the traditional civil rights narrative: 
[T]here is no “American dilemma” because black people in this country 
form a colony, and it is not in the interest of the colonial power to 
liberate them. Black people are legal citizens of the United States with, 
for the most part, the same legal rights as other citizens. Yet they stand as 
colonial subjects in relation to the white society. This institutional racism 
has another name: colonialism.77 
To Carmichael and Hamilton, race relations in the United States mirrored settler 
frameworks common in Asian, African, and Latin American societies, in which 
substantial imperial populations were able to expropriate indigenous land and 
claim political dominance. Akin to “South Africa and Rhodesia,” Carmichael and 
Hamilton argued that the United States too was a society organized around a basic 
divide between settlers and nonsettlers, with the specific African American 
condition of “black and white inhabit[ing] the same land [but] blacks subordinated 
to whites.”78 
 
76. MYRDAL, supra note 14, at 1021. 
77. STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF 
LIBERATION IN AMERICA 5 (1967). 
78. Id. at 6. 
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For such activists, the American experience was not a story of steady 
progress toward an inclusive ideal embedded in the Constitution. Rather, the 
historical practice vis-à-vis subordinated groups consisted of reproducing and 
adapting classic modes of colonial authority for changing American circumstances. 
As with similar experiments in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere, settler colonialism in 
the United States had long been organized around two distinct forms of sovereign 
power: one of democratic consent and internal checks, and another of external 
and coercive discretion.79 In the United States, such a dual framework served to 
separate free settler insiders from a patchwork of marginalized groups, particularly 
native peoples and slaves and their descendants, who found themselves subject to 
a complicated structure of overlapping hierarchies. According to Huey Newton, 
cofounder of the Black Panther Party, this duality meant that the defining feature 
of collective life had been “majority freedom and minority oppression”: “[w]hile 
the majority group achieved their basic human rights, the minorities achieved 
alienation from the lands of their fathers and slavery.”80 
For Carmichael, Hamilton, and Newton, under this internal American 
colonialism each subject community enjoyed distinct modes of governance and 
levels of rights, depending on the “majority group’s” economic needs and the 
dictates of settler political order.81 For instance, blacks and nonwhite Mexicans 
were formally granted citizenship and, by the late 1960s, even enjoyed explicit legal 
protections, but were still overwhelmingly denied the basic economic and political 
conditions essential for meaningful equality.82 For Native Americans, the 
reservation system mimicked structures of indirect rule common throughout the 
colonized world and pointedly denied indigenous peoples—whom Newton called 
“the legitimate heirs” of the national territory—their right to self-determination as 
independent and sovereign political communities.83 For such black radicals, all of 
this meant that the framing of the country in civic terms, despite its reformist 
 
79. Highlighting this duality between internal constraint and external force, Carmichael and 
Hamilton continued, “But what about . . . the system of ‘checks and balances’? We are well aware that 
political power is supposedly divided at the national level . . . . But somehow, the war in Vietnam has 
proceeded without Congressional approval.” Id. at 9. 
80. Huey Newton, To the People’s Revolutionary Constitutional Convention, Address Before 
the Plenary Session in Phila., Pa. (Sept. 5, 1970), reprinted in OFF THE PIGS! THE HISTORY AND 
LITERATURE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY 377, 378 (G. Louis Heath ed., 1976). 
81. See id. at 377–82; CARMICHAEL & HAMILTON, supra note 77, 2–32. 
82. The first chapter of Black Power, titled White Power: The Colonial Situation, gives an overview 
of how Carmichael and Hamilton believe the “colonial status operates in three areas—political, 
economic, social.” See CARMICHAEL & HAMILTON, supra note 77, at 2–32. 
83. On the experience of native peoples in the U.S. as proof of the country’s colonial 
structure, Newton states: 
We find evidence for majority freedom and minority oppression in the fact that the 
expansion of the United States Government and the acquisition of lands was at the unjust 
expense of the American Indians, who are the original possessors of the land and still its 
legitimate heirs. The long march of the Cherokees on the “Trail of Tears” and the actual 
disappearance of many other Indian nations testify to the unwillingness and inability of this 
government and this government’s Constitution to incorporate racial minorities. 
Newton, supra note 80, at 378. 
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potential, played a deeply problematic role in collective life. By cloaking basic 
structural features of the American experience from public debate, it allowed 
those features to persist in shaping the opportunities and experiences of 
historically subordinated communities. 
This presentation of the African American condition, not to mention the 
Native American and Mexican experiences, as existing in a colonial order tapped 
into a longstanding black tradition of conceiving black identity in international 
rather than purely domestic terms. If men like Teddy Roosevelt and Douglas 
MacArthur in earlier decades appreciated the extent to which the United States 
was part of a global history of white settlement, so too did black thinkers during 
the same historical periods. Especially following Reconstruction, the black journey 
from bondage to freedom and back again to bondage highlighted to late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century African Americans how, despite the 
Lincolnian rhetoric of American liberal equality, white society remained trapped 
by the same logics as other European experiments in the nonwhite world. As 
W.E.B. Du Bois wrote at the turn of the century, black inequality was only one 
piece of the global “problem of the color-line,—the relation of the darker to the 
lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.”84 
Indeed, Du Bois, like Carmichael and Hamilton after him, explicitly attempted to 
resituate the American national project in imperial terms; he remarked to an 
audience in Haiti in 1944 that colonial circumstances were not only those in which 
one country “belong[ed] to another country.”85 They also included “groups, like 
the Negros of the United States, who do not form a separate nation and yet who 
resemble in their economic and political condition a distinctly colonial status.”86 
In fact, black power activism in many ways embodied the return to political 
vibrancy, after a period in the United States marked by anticommunist 
suppression and Cold War orthodoxy, of a powerful black internationalist politics. 
According to previous leaders like Du Bois, Paul Robeson, and Hubert Harrison, 
the reality that the color line was a global issue—bound to European practices of 
empire—meant that African Americans had to question not only civic accounts of 
identity but their very allegiance to the American nation as the primary site of 
political attachment.87 For Harrison, a journalist and social critic, to the extent that 
African Americans were part of any community, it was an international 
community of “darker races” who shared the same interest in self-determination 
and independence.88 Harrison wrote in 1921, “We have appealed to the common 
patriotism which should bind us together in a common loyalty to the practice 
 
84. W.E.B. DU BOIS, Of the Dawn of Freedom, in THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: ESSAYS AND 
SKETCHES 23, 23 (Henry Steele Commager ed., Fawcett Publ’ns 1961) (1953). 
85. W.E.B. DU BOIS, The Colonial Groups in the Postwar World, in AGAINST RACISM: 
UNPUBLISHED ESSAYS, PAPERS, ADDRESSES, 1887–1961, at 229, 229 (Herbert Aptheker ed., 1985). 
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87. HUBERT HARRISON, Wanted—A Colored International, in A HUBERT HARRISON READER 
223 ( Jeffrey B. Perry ed., 2001); see, e.g., W.E.B. DU BOIS, supra note 85. 
88. HARRISON, supra note 87, at 224. 
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rather than the preachments of democracy, and in every case we have been 
rebuffed and spurned.”89 The only solution was to link the black struggle in 
America with that of “peoples of all colors” who across the globe sought “their 
own enfranchisement from the chains of slavery, social, political and economic.”90 
A half century later, Carmichael and Hamilton echoed these views and argued that 
“Black Power means that black people see themselves as part of a new force, 
sometimes called the ‘Third World’; that we see our struggle as closely related to 
liberation struggles around the world.”91 For Carmichael and Hamilton, just as for 
Harrison before them, African Americans must not seek solidarity exclusively 
within the polity, but rather “must hook up with these struggles. We must, for 
example, ask ourselves: when black people in Africa begin to storm Johannesburg, 
what will be the role of this nation—and of black people here?”92 
By the closing of the 1960s, this longstanding internationalist orientation led 
African American radicals to challenge directly the great symbols of American 
civic nationhood, in particular by explicitly tying their analysis of colonialism to 
the Constitution. In large part, this was because of a sense that key questions of 
race had moved away from those primarily of formal legal equality. As Du Bois 
himself told a college audience in North Carolina shortly before leaving for exile 
in newly independent Ghana, although the United States was “definitely 
approaching . . . a time when the American Negro will become in law equal in 
citizenship to other Americans,” this represented only “a beginning of even more 
difficult problems of race and culture.”93 For Carmichael, Newton, and others, the 
central predicament facing the country was how to uproot a colonial infrastructure 
that perpetuated black disenfranchisement, even despite formal equality.94 In 
confronting this challenge, they viewed the Constitution—especially its symbolic 
links to dominant ideas of American exceptionalism and universalism—as more a 
hindrance than an aid.95 
To begin with, Lincolnian narratives of how the Constitution gave concrete 
substance to egalitarian revolutionary ends reaffirmed widespread views of the 
United States as the quintessential anti-imperial republic—“conceived in liberty 
and dedicated to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” as Newton 
remarked.96 Thus, while the historical reality of American life was one of 
colonization, the anti-imperial and creedal narrative of the Constitution meant that 
white insiders did not see themselves as colonizers. If anything, to the extent that 
most white Americans contemplated the relationship between the United States 
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91. CARMICHAEL & HAMILTON, supra note 77, at xi. 
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93. W.E.B. DU BOIS, Whither Now and Why, in THE EDUCATION OF BLACK PEOPLE: TEN 
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94. See generally CARMICHAEL & HAMILTON, supra note 77. 
95. See infra pp. 282–86. 
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and European imperial practices, they viewed the country as a colony that shook 
off the shackles of empire. Instead of perceiving their real continuities with other 
imperial outposts, social insiders actually depicted the country as the first 
postcolonial community. In other words, they reimagined the white majority not 
as settlers at all, but if anything as natives themselves—situated in the same 
relationship to European empire as other colonized groups. There was obvious 
truth to the point that the revolutionary founding had indeed been an anti-
imperial break from England. However, this anti-imperial narrative ignored the 
equally central fact that American independence and constitutional founding did 
not entail the end of colonization. Rather, it explicitly empowered local settler 
populations and thus spurred a new phase of both expansion and political control 
over outsider groups. This meant that instead of simply one history of empire, the 
United States had been marked by a double history of British and then locally led 
expropriation.97 
Thus, for black radicals, the fact that civic conceptions, undergirded by the 
Constitution, distorted the basic relationship between white Americans and 
European empire had two related consequences. First, by reading out of the 
collective experience a post-revolutionary colonial past, constitutional discourses 
emphasized a politics of integration that downplayed the systematic forms of 
economic and political subordination that marked the pervasive experience of 
most blacks. For Newton, regardless of whether black elites now had the legal 
right to access professional power, discrimination was nowhere close to 
disappearing.98 This was because longstanding settler structures had reduced “the 
life of a substantial proportion” of the country’s nonwhite communities, not only 
blacks but American Indians and Latinos as well, to “nothing more than a prison 
of poverty.”99 As even Martin Luther King Jr. stated, such subordination 
produced the nonwhite reality of “poverty amid plenty,” in which the condition 
for those marginalized was one of “educational castration and economic 
exploitation.”100 For King, not unlike for younger black radicals, overcoming 
racism required more than elite black advancement; it entailed “a radical 
restructuring of the architecture of American society.”101 
Just as problematic, this occlusion of the colonial dimension also allowed the 
goal of black freedom in the United States to become disconnected from global 
independence struggles—the natural allies of African Americans. Even worse, the 
traditional civil rights framework, with it governing faith in civic nationhood and a 
redemptive Constitution, pressed African Americans to identify their own 
 
97. For more on the complexities of thinking of post-revolutionary America in “postcolonial” 
terms, see the discussion of early American constitutional formation in Chapter 2, Citizens and Subjects 
in Postcolonial America, of RANA, supra note 12, at 99–175. 
98. Newton, supra note 80, at 377. 
99. Id.. 
100. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR 
COMMUNITY? 112 (1967). 
101. Id. at 133. 
Rana_production read v3 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 6/28/2015  9:16 PM 
284 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:263 
interests with those of the American state regardless of how the country operated 
abroad—a fact highlighted by Myrdal’s defense of American international 
power.102 In the context of Vietnam, the traditional leadership within the black 
community opposed combining a critique of legal discrimination at home with any 
challenge to American Cold War imperatives or interventionist policies. For 
instance, Whitney Young, the head of the Urban League, warned activists at the 
NAACP’s 1966 convention that the League would denounce those groups that 
linked issues of “civil rights with the Vietnam conflict.”103 
For Carmichael, this presented the deeply perverse consequence of black 
acceptance of a national security agenda that fought against fellow colonized 
peoples while reproducing domestic conditions of racial domination.104 According 
to black radicals, Vietnam was only one example of how intertwined accounts of 
constitutionalism and American universalism undermined liberation alliances and 
destructively reframed the real enemies to black freedom—white elites at home 
and abroad—as friends of an American civic project.105 For this reason, the 1966 
Black Panther Party Platform and Program called for the exemption of black men 
from military service: “We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world 
who, like black people, are being victimized” by racism and colonial authority.106 
Nothing spoke more directly to this point than the United States’ ongoing 
relationship with South Africa. Reminding African Americans of the need for 
black opposition to the national security state—and indeed the need for an 
independent black foreign policy—Carmichael and Hamilton emphasized the United 
States’ active role in assisting apartheid: “It seems inevitable that this nation would 
move to protect its financial interests in South Africa, which means protecting 
white rule in South Africa. Black people in this country then have the 
responsibility to oppose, at least to neutralize, that effort by white America.”107 
These concerns with the political effects of constitutional rhetoric, especially 
in promoting policies that truncated black equality domestically while justifying 
interventionism abroad, led the Black Panther Party to write its own competing 
constitution. As Huey Newton declared, 
Black people and oppressed people in general have lost faith in the 
leaders of America, in the government of America, and in the very 
structure of American Government (that is, the Constitution, its legal 
foundation). This loss of faith is based upon the overwhelming evidence 
 
102. See MYRDAL, supra note 14, at 1021. 
103. MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUC-
TION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945–1982, at 105 (1984) (citation omitted). 
104. See CARMICHAEL & HAMILTON, supra note 77, at x–xii. 
105. Id. 
106. See October 1966 Black Panther Party Platform and Program, in OFF THE PIGS! THE HISTORY 
AND LITERATURE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, supra note 80, at 248, 249. 
107. CARMICHAEL & HAMILTON, supra note 77, at xi. 
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that this government will not live according to that Constitution because 
the Constitution is not designed for its people.108 
In a mass popular act of constitutional rejectionism—and indeed one of the most 
striking such acts in twentieth century America—the Panthers chose to celebrate 
the anniversary of the document by descending on Philadelphia in September 
1970 to stage a large-scale “Revolutionary People’s Constitutional Convention.”109 
Depending on estimates, the number of delegates and participants ranged from 
12,000 to 15,000 people, with 5000 to 6000 attending the plenary sessions at 
Howard University as well as Newton’s opening speech (quoted above); 
thousands more stood outside the doors but could not get seats.110 As one 
participant recalled later, delegates to the Convention came “from an array of 
organizations” besides the Panthers: “the American Indian Movement, the Brown 
Berets, the Young Lords, I wor Keun (an Asian-American group), Students for a 
Democratic Society . . . , the newly formed Gay Liberation Front, and many 
feminist groups.”111 In fact, another participant reported that various 1960s era 
activists and celebrities mingled with the crowd and took part in plenary sessions, 
from Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, Tom Hayden, and William Kunstler to 
Muhammad Ali himself.112 
The most interesting feature of the convention was that, alongside plenary 
sessions, participants broke out into workshops that produced a new alternative 
text framed around a variety of basic demands.113 These demands in many ways 
mirrored the policies increasingly debated as part of decolonization efforts in Asia 
and Africa. Abroad, such efforts had revolved around practices including 
commissions to uncover the truth about colonial crimes and related legal 
prosecutions, monetary and land-based reparations, massive resource 
redistribution to those historically subordinated, the constitutionalization of 
meaningful indigenous sovereignty, fundamental changes to internal security and 
policing (a central coercive tool of colonial regimes), and even symbolic and 
institutional changes (from renaming localities and landmarks to creating new flags 
and writing new constitutions). In line with those international debates, the 
 
108. Newton, supra note 80, at 381. 
109. See A Convention to Write a New U.S. Constitution, in OFF THE PIGS! THE HISTORY AND 
LITERATURE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, supra note 80, at 185; see also George Katsiaficas, 
Organization and Movement: The Case of the Black Panther Party and the Revolutionary People’s Constitutional 
Convention of 1970, in LIBERATION, IMAGINATION, AND THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY 141, 146 
(Kathleen Cleaver & George Katsiaficas eds., 2001). 
110. See Katsiaficas, supra note 109, at 146. 
111. Id. 
112. Trevor Wyatt Moore, A Rumbling in Babylon: Panthers Host a Parley, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, 
Oct. 28, 1970, at 1296. 
113. Revolutionary Peoples’ Constitutional Convention, Philadelphia Workshop Reports 
(Sept. 1970), in LIBERATION, IMAGINATION, AND THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY, supra note 109, at 
289. 
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Convention workshops proposed everything from broad-ranging reparations114 to 
truth commissions and political trials115 to expanded socioeconomic rights and 
significant wealth transfers (such as through the provision of free food, housing, 
clothing, medical care, and a guaranteed income)116 to fundamental changes in the 
control and exercise of military and police power (the end of the draft, the 
demobilization of the existing standing army, and, above all, community-organized 
police control boards).117 
The plan for the participants had been to reconvene in Washington, D.C. in 
November to hold a massive ratification of the new constitution, but internal 
disagreements within the Panther leadership led to the collapse of the second 
convention.118 Still, the Philadelphia Revolutionary Convention was not without 
its own political significance. In many ways, the call for explicit rupture from the 
existing constitutional order was an attempt to highlight to both whites and 
nonwhites a basic fact about the collective experience. Over the course of the 
twentieth century, it was certainly true that oppressed groups had been able to 
access greater legal protections in the United States. But these changes had 
occurred ultimately on ideological terms shaped by a white majority. Unlike 
colonized peoples abroad, African Americans and American Indians in particular 
had never been able to impose within the United States an actual conscious 
moment of colonial accounting, and with it, national disavowal. There had been 
no symbolic raising of a new flag or writing of a new governing text, let alone 
imposition of the type of sustained policies that marked decolonization efforts 
elsewhere. If anything, the civic frame had been constructed by white elites on 
terms that allowed for reform precisely so long as historically excluded 
communities accepted an unconditional attachment to the nation, its central 
symbols at home, and its practices abroad. The following conclusion explores the 
present-day implications of this absence of rupture—especially what it means for 
Americans to embrace a postcolonial identity while rejecting any colonial legacy. 
CONCLUSION: A POSTCOLONIAL IDENTITY WITHOUT DECOLONIZATION 
Today, the Revolutionary People’s Constitutional Convention has more or 
less been lost to history. And to the extent that there is any collective memory of 
black radical efforts to generate a constitutional rupture in the country, these 
efforts are largely incorporated into a very specific account of black power and of 
the Panthers in particular. Under this reading, the rise of the Panthers to 
prominence in the late 1960s—especially given their militant posturing and 
 
114. Id. at 290 (“Reparations should be made to oppressed people throughout the world, and 
we pledge ourselves to take the wealth of this country and make it available as reparations.”). 
115. Id. at 295 (“These tribunals will be decentralized and arise out of the area where the 
incidents or alleged crimes themselves took place.”). 
116. Id. at 290–94, 299–300. 
117. Id. at 298–99. 
118. For more on the story of the Convention and its aftermath, see Katsiaficas, supra note 
109, at 141–55. 
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fixation on armed self-defense—embodies the moment when the civil rights and 
student movements lost contact with mainstream America and instead descended 
into violence and irrelevancy. Moreover, such views place black radicalism’s 
anticolonial agenda, and suspicion of the great symbols of American nationhood, 
at the center of this shift away from the “good” 1960s of desegregation campaigns 
to the “bad” 1960s of urban riots and left disintegration. As Richard Rorty 
declared fifteen years ago, rather than “shar[ing] in a national hope”119 of liberal 
self-fulfillment, black radicals, along with the student activists who followed them, 
courted marginality and veered between “self-disgust” and “self-mockery.”120 The 
consequence has been that, even within what remains of politically relevant 
leftwing groups, the prevailing sentiment is that all reform projects must begin by 
reaffirming accounts of American civic promise. In a sense, not only has the 
colonial frame been dismissed, but—to the extent that there is any public 
awareness of such a frame—disassociating oneself from it is seen, even by left-
liberals, as a precondition for being taken seriously in politics. 
In these final pages, I wish to underscore the straightjacket these 
developments place on popular self-recognition, not to mention on meaningful 
reform. The actual history of the sustained shift from settler to civic imagination 
over the first half of the twentieth century highlights the extent to which civic 
arguments were constructed by settler elites themselves. Ideas of American 
exceptionalism and universalism were at root the product of debates about how an 
essentially completed settler project could transform itself into a global power, 
especially against the backdrop of a closed frontier at home and both bloody 
European rivalries and nonwhite political assertiveness abroad. Politicians and 
policymakers came to embrace an anti-slavery Civil War discourse and, in effect, 
employed this discourse to lay the ideological foundations for what would become 
the American Century. In the process, they reimagined the fundamental meaning 
of the national past while at the same time reaffirming its key markers—from 
Puritan settlement to revolutionary independence and from constitutional 
founding to continental expansion. This vision called on all communities within 
the country—regardless of their own histories of expropriation or enslavement—
to participate in an ongoing narrative of American identity, one that read 
subordination as aberrational and viewed white settlers not as colonizers but as the 
rightful inheritors of the land. 
In a sense, the black radical assault on this account was an effort to confront 
the profound dissonances such civic arguments imposed on marginalized 
communities. For many African Americans, the experience of living within the 
United States was that of an internal exile,121 and accepting redemptive stories of 
 
119. See RICHARD RORTY, ACHIEVING OUR COUNTRY: LEFTIST THOUGHT IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 8 (1998). 
120. Id. at 6. 
121. In fact, Singh and other scholars highlight how many of the key figures in twentieth-
century black politics, including Du Bois, Robeson, C.L.R. James, Richard Wright, and Robert 
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liberal national purpose did not simply mean allowing dominant presumptions 
about the country’s basic character to go unchecked. It also meant being forced 
for all intents and purposes to celebrate such exile and to suppress one’s deep 
estrangement. Indeed, the majority’s self-conception as the first independent and 
anti-imperial colony—if anything culturally similar to newly independent societies 
in the Global South—brought home this dissonance. It told native peoples in the 
United States that, as a requirement of gaining minimal respect (not even actual 
sovereignty and political autonomy), one had first to agree to one’s own 
expropriation as the natural order of things. And similarly, it required blacks to 
deny that their sustained experience of enslavement and subordination embodied 
an essential, perhaps irredeemable, truth about the nation’s character. 
The discursive triumph today of civic nationalism—and with it redemptive 
stories of American fulfillment—does more than make us all complicit in the 
perpetuation of such dissonances. It also forces any reform project to proceed 
exclusively within a framework compelling to the majority self-understanding. As 
exemplified by the mainstream civil rights movement, historically excluded groups 
cannot claim equality—let alone meaningful power—except by taking the 
dominant society’s view of itself as the actual political truth. But what happens to 
those very real modes of hierarchy that fail to resonate with national self-
perception? Even more specifically, what does it mean when a community adopts 
a postcolonial identity but denies the necessity for any systematic project of 
decolonization? In a sense, most Americans have accepted successful 
transformation—an increasingly liberal completion of the nation’s ostensible 
founding ideals—as the reality of the present, while at the same time rejecting the 
need for precisely the structural economic and political changes that might in fact 
produce equal and effective freedom. As for those that remain dispossessed, the 
lesson is simple: limit one’s own aspirations, objectives, and allies or gain little in 
return from society at large. The question for the future is whether Americans, 
both white and nonwhite, are capable or willing once again to imagine other 
alternatives. 
 
 
Williams (author of Negroes with Guns (1962) and president of the Monroe, North Carolina NAACP 
chapter) to name just a few, experienced real repression and even became actual exiles. See Singh, The 
Black Panthers, supra note 75, at 72. 
